Abstract. In one-shot investment games where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, we measure trust by the amount given to the trustee and trustworthiness by the amount returned to the trustor by the trustee. Does the degree of payoff interdependence increase both trust and trustworthiness or one but not the other or neither of them? According to our experimental data, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of trust has been extensively explored by a variety of disciplines across the social sciences, including economics, social psychology and political science. Economists usually define trust as believing in others' trustworthiness, and conceive it as a risky prospect (see, for instance, Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001; Williamson, 1993) . To account for trust in this sense, one needs an account of what determines trustworthiness and how (if at all) trust reacts to variation in trustworthiness.
Here, we focus on the influence of shared interests on trust and trustworthiness. To this aim, we modify the investment game (Berg et al., 1995) by introducing mutual payoff interdependence between players.
1 In the investment game, a trustor can send any share of her endowment to 1. How payoff interdependence can affect market outcome has been theoretically and experimentally investigated by Güth et al. (2007) , who also review the related literature.
a trustee. The amount sent is tripled before reaching the trustee, who can then return any share of what she received to the trustor. As an opportunistic trustee would return nothing to the trustor, we measure trustworthiness by the amount returned by the trustee to the trustor. Consequently, the amount that the trustor sends to the trustee measures trust in trustworthiness. In our modified game, a player decides for a given role (trustor or trustee), whose main share of payoff she collects, but also receives a share of the payoff of the other role. Hence, a player's final payoff is a convex combination of her own and her counterpart's profits. The link that we establish between payoffs is merely symbolic in the sense that it does not question the opportunistic benchmark solution with no exchange at all. Nevertheless, by varying the strength of payoff interdependence, we can manipulate the connection between parties and examine whether and to what extent this affects the propensity to invest and reward investments. This analysis is important and is expected to contribute to the ongoing debate on what affects the extent of trust in a society (e.g., Guerra and Zizzo, 2004) . While it is now well accepted that trust and trustworthiness are at the heart of what is usually meant by 'social capital' (Bellemare and Kröger, 2007) , identifying the motivations for them has proved to be a difficult task. The degree of payoff interdependence is a means to influence people's tendency to engage in trusty and trustworthy acts, and allows for an investigation of what drives such acts.
Increasing the strength of interdependence weakens the 'monetary' conflict between the parties. In particular, for the trustor, the link to the trustee's payoff implies that she automatically participates in the proceeds (the tripled amount she sends) of her investment. In other words, profit sharing reduces the risk associated with trust decisions by granting a kind of insurance to the trustor. Thus, if trust is viewed as a risky prospect, a selfinterested trustor may send more, the larger her share in the trustee's profits. A positive relation between investments by the trustor and share in the counterpart's profit is also suggested by considering trust as a social decision: the more others' interests become one's own interests, the stronger the group identity should be (Brewer and Gardner, 1996) , and the more the trustor should send (Bourhis et al., 1997; Haslam, 2001) .
The impact of payoff interdependence on trustworthiness is more ambiguous as it depends on what drives trustees' behavior. If people honor trust because they want to reward 'true' risk-taking trustors (see, for instance, Rousseau et al., 1998) , an increase in the strength of interdependence, reducing 'true' (i.e. non-calculating) risk, may crowd out trustworthiness. The tendency to fulfill trust because one believes that it has been placed on her has been named 'trust responsiveness' (Bacharach et al., 2001) . A trustresponsive agent is more likely to fulfill trust, the higher her assessment of the probability that she is being trusted by the trustor (Guerra and Zizzo, 2004) . Because the higher the interdependence, the smaller the risk associated with trust, intrinsic motivations to honor trust (like the feeling of not wanting to 'let down' the trustor 2 ) may be crowded out by the existence of the insurance granted to the trustor.
On the other hand, if shared interests prompt group identity, the stronger the interdependence, the higher the returned amounts if group favoring suffices to overcome opportunistic incentives.
3
In a former experiment focusing on ingroup/outgroup comparisons (Güth et al., 2005) , the effects of shared interests on trustworthiness were not clearcut. Only for an intermediate level of outcome interdependence, trustworthiness (but not trust) inspired ingroup-favoring behavior. Here, we study the effects of payoff interdependence more thoroughly via a specific design.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment is based on the modified investment game introduced in the previous section. Let A and B be two interacting players, each endowed with 10 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). Trustor A can send any integer amount x A to trustee B, with 0 x A 10. The amount sent is tripled and received by B, who can return any integer amount x B to A, with 0 x B 3x A . The players' profits are p A 5 10 À x A þ x B for A, and p B 5 10 À x B þ 3x A for B. Our modification via mutual profit sharing is based on payoffs:
To isolate the effects of shared interests from other confounding factors, we systematically manipulate a, but keep it low enough to not question the opportunistic solution. Clearly, any ao1/2 rules out that trustees can gain by positive returns to the trustor. For the trustor, a positive transfer does not pay for any ao1/4 as À (1 À a)x A þ a3x A o0 is equivalent to ao1/4 for x A 40. To preserve the social dilemma character of the game, we use a ¼ a ¼ 0:02 and a ¼ a ¼ 0:18 in our experimental treatments, and a 5 0 in our control treatment.
5 If parties are opportunistic, transfers should be zero in all treatments, regardless of a.
The computerized experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute in Jena, using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 1999) . Participants were undergraduate students from different disciplines at the University of Jena. After being seated at a computer terminal, participants 2. See Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) for the notion of let-down aversion. 3. Of course, one may argue that some group identity is created merely by 'playing a game'. If so, we would study only how much additional group identity feelings are created by payoff interdependence. 4. Situations where interaction is not limited to transaction but allows for positive externalities are social environments or stable organizations like firms or families. 5. Setting a 5 0.02 allows us to check whether minimal profit sharing suffices to trigger group identity. The instructions of the control treatment included no reference to a. received written instructions (see Appendix A for an English translation) and were requested to read them individually. We then went through the instructions with the subjects and answered questions individually. Understanding of the rules was ensured by a control questionnaire that subjects had to complete before the experiment started. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to roles of trustor and trustee, and they played the modified investment game described above only once.
Impact of Payoff Interdependence
In total, we ran three sessions, each involving 32 participants and employing one of the three treatments. Sessions took about 45 minutes with most of the time being used up for reading the instructions carefully and answering the control questions. We implemented an exchange rate of 10 ECU 5 h5.00 and the average earning per subject was h14.90. Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics on investment decisions in each treatment. Table 1 refers to the trustors and reports on the absolute amounts sent. Table 2 refers to the trustees and reports on the return ratio x B /x A .
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In line with earlier findings (Berg et al., 1995; Cox, 2004; Gneezy et al., 2000; Ortmann et al., 2000) , the average amount sent is around half the endowment in all treatments. Quite surprisingly, it is the highest in the a treatment. However, non-parametric tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the values come from the same distribution ( p40.3 for all comparisons, Note: n has the same interpretation as in Table 1 ; missing values are due to x A 5 0.
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests). Trust decisions remain, therefore, unaffected by the creation of a link between one's own and the trustee's profits. Turning to the trustees' behavior, Table 2 reveals that only in the a treatment the average return ratio is greater than 1, while in the control treatment and in the a treatment positive investments by the trustors are not rewarded properly. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (one-sided) confirm that trustees return significantly more when a 5 0.18 than when a 5 0.02 ( p 5 0.045). Therefore, even with conservative non-parametric tests, we find that stronger mutual sharing strengthens trustworthiness.
The effect of shared interests on amounts sent and returned is explored in more detail via generalized linear regressions, whose results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 for trustors and trustees, respectively. For the trustors we assume a negative binomial (rather than Poisson) distribution due to overdispersion in the data.
The regression for the trustors has sending decisions (x A ) as the dependent variable and treatment dummies as the independent variables (with a 5 0 as baseline). Each dummy takes value 1 in the respective treatment and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of both a and a are not significant, meaning (in line with the results of the non-parametric tests) that sharing in the trustee's profits has no significant impact on the trustors' sending decisions.
The Poisson regression for the trustee's models amounts returned (x B ) as functions of trustors' amounts sent (x A ) and treatment dummies having the same interpretation as before. The amount sent by the trustor has a significantly positive effect on the amount returned by the trustee. The coefficient of a is positive and significant, implying that a high share in the trustor's profits has a significantly positive effect on amounts returned as compared with the control treatment. In contrast, the effect of low share on trustworthiness is negative, but not significantly so. Hence, the regressions confirm the results emerging from the previous analysis: while trust is not significantly affected by the level of profit-sharing, trustworthiness is. Table 5 provides details about the distribution of choices in each treatment. As to the trustors, we rely on the following classification: nontrust (or opportunism) if x A 5 0, weak trust if 0ox A 5, strong trust if 5ox A o10, and full trust if x A 5 10. In line with previous findings, the distribution of choices is very similar in all three treatments, although the frequency of opportunistic choices is the lowest in case of a 5 0.02. This may explain the higher average amount sent in this treatment as compared with the others.
Turning to trustees, based on the return ratio r 5 x B /x A (for x A 40), we classify their choices as follows: non-reciprocity (or opportunism) if r 5 0, half-exploitation if 0oro1, weak reciprocity if r 5 1 (or x B 5 x A ) and strong reciprocity if r41. Quite generally, choices tend to be concentrated on extreme categories in all treatments. However, the number of trustees who return more than the amount received is the highest in the a treatment: about 80% of the trustees exhibit strong reciprocity when their share in the others' profit is 0.18, which compares with percentages of 50% and 33% in the control and the a treatments, respectively. To sum up, the individual analysis corroborates the aggregate findings that trustworthiness reacts positively to an increase in a.
CONCLUSIONS
We provide experimental evidence for a different reaction of trust and trustworthiness to various levels of payoff interdependence. In particular, I  II  III  IV  I  II  III 
Notes: For trustors: I, non-trust; II, weak trust; III, strong trust; IV, full trust. For trustees: I, opportunism; II, half-exploitation; III, weak reciprocity; IV, strong reciprocity.
trust does not change significantly when different degrees of shared interests between trustors and trustees are exogenously established. In contrast, trustworthiness reacts positively to the extent of interdependence. Thus, at least in our setting, trust seems to be driven by idiosyncratic predispositions to cooperate, whereas trustworthiness is more affected by cognitive perceptions of the social domain in which interaction takes place. Deliberated trust, based on realistic beliefs about others' trustworthiness, is not supported by our data. This may result in missing profitable investment opportunities and in payoff losses for both parties.
APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS
This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) we used for the a treatment. The instructions for the other treatments were adapted accordingly and are available on request.
A.1. Introduction (general)
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. From now on any communication with other participants is forbidden. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand. We will answer your questions individually. It is very important that you follow this rule; otherwise we will exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. The experiment allows you to earn money. Your experimental income will be calculated in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), where 1 ECU 5 h0.50. At the end of the experiment, the ECU you have earned will be converted to euros and paid to you in cash.
A.2. Detailed information on the experiment
In this experiment, participants are randomly divided into pairs. This means that you will be interacting with another participant, whose identity will not be revealed to you at any time. At the beginning of the experiment, the two members of a pair will be randomly assigned one of two roles: either A or B. Each A-person and each B-person will receive an endowment of 10 ECU, and must take only one decision.
A.2.1. A-participants' task
As an A-person, you must decide how much of your endowment you want to give to B. You can choose only integer amounts; i.e. 0, 1, 2, . . ., 9 or 10 ECU. For any amount you decide to give, B will receive the triple. For instance, if you give 1 ECU, B will receive 3 ECU; if you give 3 ECU, (s)he will receive 9 ECU; if you give 5 ECU, (s)he will receive 15 ECU. After all participants have made their choice, you will receive information about your own return, the other's return and your experimental earnings. If you are an A-person, you will also be informed about the number of ECU you received from B.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions to verify your understanding of the experiment.
Please remain quiet until the experiment starts. If you have any questions, please raise your hand now.
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